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Humanitarian Mine Action in  
 Afghanistan: A History
After a decade of Soviet occupation in Afghanistan and the resulting internal conflict, the re-
moval of explosive remnants of war (ERW) became a complicated issue. Systematic clear-
ance of ERW was difficult to establish due to the volatile security situation and an inability 
to regulate clearance work. However, due to collaboration between the United Nations and 
Afghan nongovernmental organizations, mine clearance operations were successfully es-
tablished in Afghanistan in the 1990s.
by Ian Mansfield
The humanitarian mine action sector, as we understand it today, originated in Afghanistan in late 1988. Prior to that 
time, many assumed that the military would 
be responsible for clearing explosive remnants 
of war (ERW), as was necessary in Europe after 
World War II. However, when the Soviet army 
withdrew from Afghanistan in February 1989 af-
ter a ten-year occupation, it was suspected that 
millions of anti-personnel landmines remained. 
The Soviet army was not going to clear them, and 
no recognized government or army existed in 
Afghanistan to deal with the problem. With over 
five million Afghan refugees living in Pakistan 
and another three million in Iran, the U.N. saw 
that a humanitarian catastrophe would unfold if 
these refugees suddenly decided to return home 
to their mine-contaminated villages.
During combat operations, the military’s only aim was to clear lanes through a minefield and then continue with their 
mission. While similar equipment was used in Afghanistan, civilian or humanitarian demining focused on clearing all 
landmines and returning land to productive use.
Photo courtesy of GICHD.
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Role of the United Nations
In 1988, the U.N. launched a general human-
itarian relief program, Operation Salam, to as-
sist Afghanistan. The United Nations Office for 
the Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance in 
Afghanistan (UNOCHA) initiated an appeal in 
October 1988 for funds to help train Afghans to 
clear the landmines. A village demining concept 
was considered the best option. The U.N. would 
train Afghan refugees in basic mine clearance skills 
and when they returned home they would clear 
their village of landmines. The response to the ap-
peal was poor, and only Japan and the United States 
made pledges of money. The vast majority of coun-
tries still regarded landmines as a military problem 
rather than a humanitarian one. 
A plan was devised whereby a number of pre-
dominately Western countries would provide mili-
tary experts to UNOCHA to train Afghan civilians. 
This group included Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, Norway, Turkey, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. After a two-week training course 
was developed, thousands of Afghans from the ref-
ugee camps in Peshawar and Quetta were trained in 
basic mine clearance skills from 1989 to 1990. 
However, the plan did not work for multiple rea-
sons. The level of mine clearance training provided 
was very basic and equipment, such as sensitive, mil-
itary-style mine detectors, were not generally avail-
able. Moreover, in an extremely difficult and volatile 
security situation, returning groups of Afghan ex-
fighters or mujahedeen with metal detectors and 
bags of explosives could just as easily have destabi-
lized Afghanistan further. Even if the civilian de-
miners went in, there was no method of enforcing 
safety standards or to properly record and regulate 
their work. Finally, had this scheme been success-
ful, the ability to continually train such large num-
bers of civilians would have been curtailed anyway. 
In February 1991, all contributing nations, except 
Australia and New Zealand, withdrew their contin-
gents from Operation Salam due to commitments 
in the first Gulf War.
Afghan Demining NGOs
Due to ongoing insecurity in Afghanistan, ref-
ugees did not return in large numbers. UNOCHA 
began liaising with potential partner organiza-
tions to have them undertake mine clearance work 
on a more organized and controlled basis. There 
were over 100 NGOs conducting relief activities in 
Afghanistan and Pakistan at that time. However, 
none of these nongovernmental organizations 
worked in mine clearance, so UNOCHA decided to 
create specialized organizations to fill this void.  
The training camp near Peshawar now trained 
fewer people but to a higher standard, and the grad-
uates were employed by one of the new Afghan 
mine clearance NGOs according to predetermined 
needs. Although the U.N. had decided to estab-
lish Afghan organizations that would undertake 
mine clearance work, two other international mine 
clearance organizations also had their beginnings 
around this time. The first was the British charity 
The HALO Trust, standing for Hazardous Areas 
Life-support Organisation. HALO was first regis-
tered as a charity in the United Kingdom in 1988 
by Colin Mitchell and began small-scale clearance 
operations in and around Kabul in 1989. With its 
roots in Afghanistan, the second international or-
ganization was MAG (Mines Advisory Group), an-
other British NGO. Rae McGrath, founder of MAG, 
conducted the first survey of mined areas in some of 
the eastern provinces of Afghanistan and published 
a report under the name of MAG.  
Organizational Changes
Before 1991, the mine clearance effort consisted 
of a series of separate U.N. funded projects, where 
each of the newly formed Afghan demining NGOs 
Before starting work, a demining team would test their equip-
ment and then pray for a safe day’s work.
Photo courtesy of Afghan Technical Consultants.
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were given a particular thematic or geographic task. 
Some were organized to do mine clearance work, 
which was gradually referred to as humanitarian de-
mining to differentiate it from the military combat 
term of minefield breaching. One such Afghan NGO, 
the Organisation for Mine Clearance and Afghan 
Rehabilitation (OMAR) undertook mine awareness 
or safety education campaigns in the refugee camps, 
while the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA) 
was set up to conduct minefield surveys, produce 
minefield maps and coordinate the work of the other 
NGOs. This latter task was doomed to fail, as tradi-
tionally NGOs dislike being coordinated by anyone, 
let alone another NGO. The funding for all projects 
was provided through UNOCHA.
Due to public criticism of slow progress and 
the way the landmine problem was being dealt 
with in Afghanistan, UNOCHA commissioned 
an independent evaluation to review the situa-
tion. The independent review was quite critical 
of the whole mine clearance set-up and identified 
over 40 areas where improvements could be made. 
It recommended that in the absence of a recog-
nized government in Afghanistan, there should 
be more central oversight and coordination exert-
ed by the U.N., along with other technical and op-
erational changes. In December 1991, I assumed 
the position of mine clearance program manager, 
and together with the head of UNOCHA, Martin 
Barber, studied the evaluation report in detail, 
and devised a plan to introduce a more coordinat-
ed and centralized response to the problem.  
We moved MCPA from Peshawar to our head-
quarters in Islamabad in early 1992. MCPA 
brought their minefield database and operations 
staff to Islamabad, and the combined offices were 
responsible for coordination, tasking, training, 
accident investigation, quality control, etc. The 
first National Mine Clearance Plan was issued in 
1992, which set the priorities for awareness, sur-
vey and clearance work, and also outlined targets 
and funding requirements.
Survey
Due to security issues, it was not possible to con-
duct a national survey at the outset of the program. 
However, an excellent system of technical survey 
was established. Highly trained surveyors from 
MCPA would go to areas in Afghanistan where ref-
ugees were returning and conduct what were then 
known as Level 2 Surveys, now called technical 
surveys. The surveyors would collect information 
from locals and determine the minefield boundar-
ies (along the lines of today’s land release concepts) 
using their detectors, marking the perimeter with 
red-painted rocks (as other marking material such 
as wooden stakes would be stolen). Surveyors would 
also make test lanes through the mined area to de-
termine the types and number of mines that were 
present. Once a detailed, hand-drawn map was pro-
duced, the surveyors were required to predict how 
long it would take to clear the minefield. These fore-
casts became surprisingly accurate as time passed. 
The completed survey maps were put into the 
A refugee camp set up for displaced persons near Jalala-
bad in 1992. The area was quickly checked for unexploded 
ordnance before the camp could be established.
Photo courtesy of author.
An Afghan deminer laying down and prodding at a low an-
gle for a buried landmine.
Photo courtesy of author.
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priority system, and the tasks subsequently allocat-
ed to one of the demining NGOs to clear.
It was not until 1993 that increased funding and an 
improved security situation allowed MCPA to under-
take a national-level non-technical survey. The aim of 
the survey was to better quantify the landmine prob-
lem, to help establish priority areas for clearance and 
to assist with effective, long-term planning of clear-
ance operations. Trained interviewers, both men and 
women, conducted surveys with civilians in most 
provinces and districts of the country. The results 
were staggering; throughout Afghanistan as many as 
20 civilians were killed or injured by landmines every 
day. Over 900 villages in 162 districts reported mine 
problems, and 2,300 minefields were identified cover-
ing an area of 380 sq km. 
Together with refugee tracking figures provided 
by the United Nations High Commissioner for Ref-
ugees (UNHCR), this survey was the basis of our 
planning for many years to come. Because the total 
area affected by landmines was so large, each mine-
field was classified as high or low priority before it 
was scheduled for clearance. The determining crite-
ria were as follows:
• All local groups must be united in  
requesting assistance
• Area must be secure and free from fighting
• Area is free from opium poppy cultivation
• Population must be able to draw immediate  
socioeconomic benefit
• Refugees must already be re-
turning to the area
• Some support is to be provided by the  
local population
• Proof that funded rehabilitation or devel-
opment projects are delayed due to mines
Manual Mine Clearance
Although slow, manual demining was the main 
method of clearance and was the most reliable way 
for achieving complete clearance. An advantage 
of manual demining was that it brought employ-
ment to war-torn Afghanistan. By 1992, over 2,000 
Afghans became deminers with training, good sal-
aries and insurance. 
Originally, foreign military contingents trained 
Afghan deminers by adapting military mine clear-
ance skills. The deminers were grouped into teams 
of 30 men (the same as a military platoon), with 
each breaching party consisting of three people. The 
first member of the breaching party operated with 
a long stick or a thin metal rod, gently feeling for 
trip wires, the second operated the metal detector 
and the third was the prodder man. In the military 
setting, the first person also acted as a lookout and 
would be armed with a rifle to provide protection.
It quickly became apparent that this process 
could be done more efficiently. The three-man 
breaching parties were immediately reduced to two 
men, while a section leader usually oversaw four or 
five breaching parties at any one time. After a se-
ries of trials in 1993, the program instituted a one-
man drill where the detector operator laid down his 
detector after a reading and prodded his own sig-
nal. This, along with other changes such as reduced 
travel times and shorter breaks, helped improve 
clearance rates and efficiency.
Mechanical. The program also had a mechanical 
component. UNOCHA purchased two Aardvark 
flail machines in 1990, but while it was thought that 
they had great potential to speed up the clearance 
rate, the practical difficulties of security, logistics, 
maintenance and fuel consumption created exces-
sive down time for the machines. Moreover, iden-
tifying suitable minefield sites for the machine to 
work was similarly difficult, and the machine did 
not guarantee full clearance.  
Vegetation clearance was not normally problem-
atic, except around irrigation canals. The program 
An Afghan deminer inspecting a POM-Z fragmentation 
mine. In the early days of the Afghan mine clearance pro-
gram, protective equipment was not available for demin-
ers or visitors.
Photo courtesy of author.
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later used a number of armored back hoes to pre-
pare canals for clearance, and HALO experienced 
some success with armored bucket loaders when 
removing rubble from damaged houses in Kabul.
Dogs. RONCO ran a mule program during the 
Soviet-Afghan war, providing mules to the muja-
hedeen to ferry supplies through the mountains 
into Afghanistan. After the Soviet withdrawal this 
was converted to a mine detecting dog program. 
RONCO established kennels, veterinarian servic-
es and training facilities in Pabbi on the outskirts 
of Peshawar. The training regime for the dogs ap-
peared sound, but their employment and tasking 
in Afghanistan was haphazard. The United States 
wanted to move forward from this commitment, 
so the project was reorganized in 1992 under the 
Afghan NGO known as the Mine Dog Centre.
Up until 1992, the method of employing dogs 
was to assign a few dogs and their handlers to a 
manual demining team. However the majority of 
manual demining team leaders did not trust the 
dogs. They would often run the dogs over an area, 
and even if the dogs found nothing, would go over 
the same area with manual deminers. This was be-
cause the team leader had to sign a paper at the end 
of a job stating that the area was clear of landmines. 
The result was that it actually took more time, not 
less, to clear an area. 
A decision was made in certain cases to make 
the dog team leader the person who signed the 
certificate declaring the area was clear. Trials were 
set up and the new groups had four dogs and han-
dlers, along with a section of manual deminers. 
This proved to be more efficient and the speed at 
which these groups worked was amazing. To mit-
igate the risk of a missed mine, two or three dogs 
went over the same area to make sure nothing was 
overlooked. By using the dogs to their full capacity, 
they were very quickly able to eliminate areas that 
were not mined.
Resource Management 
Evaluators and journalists visiting the program 
often asked questions such as “What is the rate of 
mine clearance” and “How much does it cost to 
clear landmines?” The daily rate of clearance by a 
manual deminer varied greatly, depending on the 
conditions. A manual deminer could clear, on aver-
age, between 10 and 100 square meters per day. The 
clearance rate for dog teams was much higher and 
while the advertised clearance rate for the flail ma-
chines was also much higher, it was rarely achieved. 
The cost of mine clearance was difficult to de-
termine. While donor contributions were simple to 
quantify, other support such as seconded technical 
advisers and grants of equipment were more diffi-
cult to monetize. As a rough measure, we totaled up 
our different types of income for the year and divid-
ed it by the total number of square meters of land 
the NGOs had cleared. This consistently worked out 
Dogs were trained to use their sense of smell to sniff out 
buried landmines, particularly because they had the advan-
tage of ignoring metal fragments.
Photo courtesy of author.
In Kabul, unexploded ordnance was as much a problem as 
landmines. Here a deminer points to a mortar round that 
landed and failed to explode in the rubble of a building.
Photo courtesy of author.
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to about US$1 per square meter; this was a figure 
that was often published.  
The cost of clearing an individual landmine 
was even more problematic. Based on the annual 
income of the program divided by the number of 
mines found, each mine cost approximately US$300 
to clear. This figure was widely used in the interna-
tional press, particularly to highlight the fact that a 
weapon that cost only a few dollars to buy and place 
in the ground, was now costing hundreds of dollars 
to clear. However, this figure needed to be clarified. 
If teams were working in large, defensive minefield 
belts, they would find many mines quite easily and 
the cost per mine would go down. Alternatively, 
a road or an agricultural field only needed a cou-
ple of mines to prevent people from using the area 
completely. Despite attempts to reduce the area that 
needed to be cleared down to the minimum using 
the survey teams, large areas often yielded only a 
few mines. In these cases, the cost could rise as high 
as $1,000 per mine.
Post-1995
In 1995, the program continued despite im-
mense difficulties during the Taliban period; subse-
quent U.N. program managers were Bill van Ree 
and Ian Bullpitt. Dan Kelly ran the program during 
the period of the U.S. invasion in 2002 and after that 
the new Afghan government asked the U.N. to con-
tinue running the program, thus Alan Mac Donald 
and Abigail Hartley from UNMAS continued the 
work. In 2012, Mohammad Sediq Rashid took over 
as the first Afghan Director of the United Nations 
Mine Action Center for Afghanistan (UNMACA), 
and in recent years, efforts have been made to have 
the Afghan government and their Department of 
Mine Clearance take over full management of the 
program.  After 26 years of operations the program 
has grown to involve 52 NGO or commercial orga-
nizations employing over 8,000 Afghans. Over 80 
percent of minefields have been cleared and 
Afghanistan has set itself the target to be mine free 
by 2023.1  
See endnotes page 67
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